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Abstract 
This study discusses the possibility of the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) through coalitional games. 
From the perspective of coalitional game, the grand coalition of ASEAN6, China, Japan and Korea under the 
EAFTA is in the core, which is stable as no winning coalition against it. The countries try to deal in the 
coalitions with the highest total welfares for all which finally come to the formation of {(ASEAN6, China), 
(ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}. From the alternative coalition, it seems that the presence of ASEAN6 
can be in any coalition and be a catalyst to the EAFTA. 
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1. Introduction 
In the real world of trade negotiation having cooperation in trade game which consists of all countries is not so 
simple. If it is the case, then the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) can be difficult to achieve or it will need 
longer time. The longer process of the establishment of the EAFTA could be due to the conflicting economic and 
non-economic factors that may exist. The negotiating countries may choose the other paths of trade liberalization 
by forming coalitions among the members.   
 
The coalition is performed in order to ease the difficulties related to the complex interests of the parties 
(Elgstrom et al. 2001). Coalitional game can be formed if the members can negotiate effectively. There are some 
factors that can influence the ease of establishing coalitions such as geographical, sociological, cultural or 
linguistic aspects (Myerson 1997). The exogenous factors can positively give impacts if the negotiating parties 
can manage these factors effectively.  
 
For any game with more than 2 players (multi-players), the presence of n-person Nash bargaining without 
analysis of coalitions does not show the possible powers of multiple coalitions that may exist.  It is insufficient 
when we concern only on the grand coalition by ignoring the powers of multiplayer coalitions. In the model with 
4 players (ASEAN6, China, Japan and Korea), it is necessary to apply coalitional game in the analysis (Myerson 
1997; Branzeiet.al. 2008). The term of ASEAN6 is used to represent the six ASEAN members, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam which are included in the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) Database
2
.  In terms of trade negotiation game, the condition of existing coalition is 
possible because negotiating countries are trying to get the maximum gains from free trade. This study 
investigates the possible trade coalitions that may exist in the establishment process of the EAFTA. Some 
coalitions of, for example, ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-China-Japan, ASEAN-China-Korea will be investigated to 
find the pathway to the EAFTA. 
 
2. The Road To East Asian Economic Integration 
The movement toward regional trading arrangements is part of the process of the globalization of trade, which 
started in the 1980s (Josling 1993). One view is that the gradual introduction of free trade or trade liberalization 
at a regional level could be considered as the initial steps towards global liberalization of trade. Such 
liberalization may be initially easier when a small number of countries are involved (Bhalla and Bhalla 1997). 
 
Free Trade Area (FTA) is one types of the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) in which tariffs are lowered 
on products traded to other members but still maintained against countries that are not members.
3
 The efforts to 
form regional trade agreements are based mostly on geographic proximity and global economic development. 
Empirically, PTAs in the global economy are all geographically based (Krugman 1993). It would also appear 
that, in general, the closer countries are to each other, the larger the percentage of trade that takes place between 
them. In addition, Egger and Larch (2008) argued that trade is not only impeded by ad-valorem tariffs but also 
by non-tariff intra and intercontinental trade costs; which is related to what we call for geographical factor or 
distance in the gravity model. As one implication, the creation FTA induces the neighbor or non-distant outsiders 
                                                 
2 The GTAP Version 6.2 contains 87 countries/regions and covers 57 sectors. 
3
 The classification of PTA basically depends on the ease of access in either international trade or investment 
activities in an ascending order of economic integration. 
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to join (Egger and Larch 2008). On the one hand, the larger the volume of trade between countries within a 
regional bloc, the greater the potential for trade creation and the less for trade diversion, making the agreement 
more likely to be welfare-enhancing rather than welfare-reducing (Plummer 1996; Sager 1997; Frankel and Wei 
1998). On the other hand, the larger the number of participating countries the larger the differing vested interests 
from each individual country. As a consequence, more complicated problems arise in dealing with these different 
interests. In recent years, the creation of FTA is not just a matter of geographical proximity; other strategic 
reasons such as political pressures also controlled the FTA (Rosendorff and Milner 2001). In addition, to some 
certain condition, FTAs are performed as a way to create strong political pathways with other countries, 
especially with big countries, such as FTA between Singapore and the United States of America (USA) under 
the Singapore-US FTA (Sally 2006). 
 
Conforti and Salvatici (2004) used game theory to investigate the interaction of the countries (developed and 
developing countries) in the formation of FTA. They concluded that free trade or strong trade liberalization 
would be the dominant strategy for developing and developed countries. Rosendorff and Milner (2001) used the 
models of two-stage game: international bargaining and the repeated trade (sub) games that allow a country to 
perform trade policies and incorporate an escape clause under the signed agreements.
4
 The models assume that 
the information about other domestic political pressures is limited as we do not know exactly what kinds of 
political pressures happen in other countries. They argued that the escape clause could help the government to 
preserve international agreements while still get advantage from domestic political support, which is important 
part for successful international trade agreements. 
 
The economic interdependence forces the neighboring countries in East Asia to cooperate and integrate their 
economies under the agreements. In the case of Southeast Asia, ASEAN have become more active in fostering 
economic cooperation in the region since the 1980s. In 1992 the ASEAN signed the Agreement on the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). 
 
Within the last few years, especially after the Asian economic crisis erupted in 1997, there has been intense 
economic cooperation among East Asian countries, especially those comprising the ASEAN countries, Japan, 
China and Korea. At the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT) informal summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, the 
participants agreed to hold regular leaders' meetings regarding the initiative to build an East Asian Community 
(EAC). This APT represents the regional dialogue process incorporating the East Asian countries. It was 
designed to promote greater regional economic cooperation.  
 
The establishment of some FTA in East Asia such as ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN-Korea FTA and other 
ongoing process of bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and ASEAN countries has 
created an effective pathway to gradual regional economic integration in East Asia. It seems that this movement 
into FTA is likely to continue in East Asia.  The establishment of regional FTAs inside East Asian region can 
be seen as a stepping stone to the creation of the EAFTA. 
 
The proliferation of FTA in East Asia also comes from the competitive nature of FTA (Sussangkarn 2006). 
Once a competitor of one country signs an FTA with other countries, this will enforce the respective country to 
create the same pathway to avoid the disadvantage matters. For example, the creation of ASEAN-China FTA in 
2002 gave a strong pressure to Japan to create the kinds of FTAs which finally force Japan to create such as EPA 
with other countries in the region. Without the movement of China into the ASEAN-China FTA, Japan will not 
be so intense to conclude the kind of bilateral FTA with ASEAN members (Sussangkarn 2006). 
 
3. The Coalitional Game Model 
 
3.1 Coalitional Game 
Parties in a game may deviate from grand coalition
5
 due to the possible inefficiency of the grand coalition, which 
is sometimes difficult to realize because of some conditions. A better outcome by deviating unilaterally could be 
a fundamental reason. Coalition
6
 is a group of players in game (negotiation) that collectively agree to do together 
to achieve a common goal  (Hart and Kurz 1983; Branzeiet.al. 2008).  They act as a single unit relative to the 
                                                 
4
 The escape clause is treated endogenously to the models as an equilibrium outcome for the countries in 
strategic trade game (Rosendorff and Milner 2001). 
5
 Grand coalition is a coalition that consists of all players. 
6
 For better understanding of coalition, then practical definition of coalition is given as shown in part IIIB. 
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rest of the players (which do not belong to the coalitions) (Hart and Kurz 1983). It is formed mostly as a counter 
of other player(s). 
 
Coalitional game assumes that the members can negotiate effectively among them (Myerson 1997). It means that 
the members can actually change their strategies as long as it will give them a better or more benefits for all (the 
members of coalitions). Once the changing strategy could not give a larger benefit for all (except for them), they 
may think that other members also do similar movements. Under the Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative game, 
there are no profitable unilateral deviations. The assumption behind this concept is that players cannot 
communicate or coordinate with another on any joint agreement. Then, under cooperative game, the players are 
assumed to have communication among them and even by doing multilateral deviations such as coalitions 
(Vega-Redondo 2003). The coalitional game in the study assumes that the players are performing cooperative 
game where the player pays attention not only on its payoff but also on the total payoffs of the game. 
 
In addition, "moral hazard" problem may exist because of the difficulties in monitoring the performance of grand 
coalition that cause non-optimal outcome (Greenberg 1994). In a game with fewer players (two players), the 
agreement/equilibrium is easy to set either cooperate or not cooperate. The negotiation is easier when the number 
of players is small, even though the smaller number of participants does not guarantee the successful agreement. 
In order for players to get larger benefits, they may deviate from the previous agreement (equilibrium). The 
increasing number of the parties (in trade negotiation) tends to create increasing complexity in the negotiation 
process. This is because the potential conflicts coming from the diverse  individual interests cause the self-
enforcing agreement may be hard or impossible to achieve (Bazerman et.al. 2000). 
 
In the analysis of coalitional game, suppose we have a set of all players N = (1, 2, …, n). Then a subset of N is 
called as a coalition. The coalitional game takes the form (N, v). The characteristic function is defined as worth 
of coalition, v (C), which refers to the total amount of payoffs that can be achieved by forming coalition C such 
that   
 = 0        (1) 
where  denotes the empty set. It means that no coalition has worth of zero. 
   
In coalitional games, we use coalitional game with transferable utility. Transferable utility means that the worth 
of a coalition C (the characteristic function v(C)) is a single number (Kannai 1992). The GTAP model is used to 
simulate trade negotiation game and find the payoff which is in the form of Equivalent Variation (EV). The EV 
value as a representation of payoff can be categorized as transferable utility as this payoff can be divided and 
distributed among the players. It is simply an n-dimensional vector  
xi = (x㸯, …x㹬)       (2) 
Payoff xi is corresponding payoff for player ith. The allocation of payoff is feasible if the total payoff allocation 
for the members of coalition is smaller or equal to the worth of coalition (Myerson 1997). In other words, let us 
say y as payoff allocation. Payoff allocation of y is feasible for coalition C if and only if  
       (3) 
In grand coalition, its worth v(N) can be formulated as (Myerson, 1997): 
       (4) 
The worth of coalition N of all players (grand coalition) with transferable payoff is greater or equal to the sum of 
the payoffs of any sub-coalition of N (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994): 
 (5) 
 
The analysis of coalition cannot be far away from stability. The stability also refers to self-enforcing agreement 
(Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 1987) or core concept (Sene, 1996). An agreement is stable (self enforcing) if 
(and only if) no possible coalition (deviation from previous agreements) that players want to deviate in order to 
be better off.  The core is the fundamental stability concept in coalitional games. In a non-cooperative game the 
concept of Nash equilibrium’s outcome of strategic game is stable because no unilateral deviation gives better 
result. Under the coalitional game, the core is considered to be stable if no other coalition could give a better 
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payoff for all members or the total payoffs of a new coalition are greater than the current payoffs (Osborne and 
Rubinstein 1994) or at least one better off and none of the rest worse off (Schmidt 2004).   
 
The best allocation of the payoff is when the allocation is in the core. The payoff allocation of x is in the core of 
v if and only if x is feasible and there is no coalition can increase the payoffs more than x. In other form, x is in 
the core if and only if (Myerson, 1997): 
   (6) 
 
3.2  The Coalitional Game Model  
In this study, ASEAN6 consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The 
investigation of coalitional games in this study is based on the ASEAN6 as single entity only. ASEAN6 as a 
single entity means that the ASEAN members behave in the same way (applying homogenous strategy). For 
example: if ASEAN decides to choose strategy x then each ASEAN members should choose the strategy x. So, 
principally by this treatment we have only four players: ASEAN6, China, Japan and Korea. 
 
Practical definition of coalition is given to explain the process of game simulation. In the coalitional process, one 
country or existing coalition may join to form a new coalition. For example, in the formation of {(ASEAN6, 
China), Japan}, the coalition of ASEAN-China is already exist. Then, Japan enters the new coalition together 
with the existing coalition of ASEAN-China.
7
 
 
The possible coalitions that may be formed in East Asian region are presented in Figure 1. The EAFTA can be 
constructed from coalitions coming from the fewer members (as shown in Figure 1.
8
 At Tier II, the possible 
coalitions, including the existing ones, consists of two members such as (ASEAN6, China), (China, Japan), etc. 
Then, Tier II coalitions coalesce together to form Tier III coalitions consisting of three members, such as 
coalitions of (ASEAN6, China, Japan), (ASEAN6, China, Korea). The three-membership coalitions can be 
coming from many sub-coalitions, such as coalition of (China, Japan, Korea) which comes from several forms 
such as {(China, Japan), Korea}, {China, Korea}, {Japan, Korea}. 
 
The processes to the grand coalition of the EAFTA consisting of four members also come from many possible 
formations of the Tier III coalitions. The presence of CJK into Tier IV is possible if ASEAN and Japan are 
already in the ASEAN-Japan FTA. So, the possible way to have a grand coalition of ACJK is by renegotiating 
AC, AK, AJ and CJK and, finally, having the coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, 
Japan), (China, Japan, Korea)}. Or, if ACK already exists, the ACJK can be the grand coalition through 
{(ASEAN6, China, Korea), (China, Japan, Korea)}. But the formation of ACJK cannot come from {(China, 
Japan, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}. It is because by assumption AC and AK should come together. In addition, it 
seems that there is a possibility of direct movement from Tier II to Tier IV. This coalitional leap is in the 
formation of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}.
9
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 From the membership point of view, the coalition of {(A, C), J} and {(A, C, J} are indifferent. But, they are 
different in the process and payoffs (welfare impacts).  In the {(A, C), J} ASEAN-China have been in the FTA 
which mean they have zero tariffs already for their traded products before Japan entering the coalition. When 
Japan joins the coalition, the only existing tariffs are between ASEAN- Japan and China Japan. Meanwhile, the 
coalition of {(A, C, J}, the existing tariffs are still between ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan and Japan-China. So, 
from these kinds of simulations, the values of coalitions, v (C) are different. 
8
 In the process of movement from lower tier to higher tier, the coalitional game models applied in the simulation 
assume that participating countries are playing cooperative game where the overall (total) welfare impacts is in 
the priority, instead of playing non-cooperative game in which the country just pay attention on the largest payoff 
that it could get. Under cooperative game, one country will move to the new coalition (or moving from one 
equilibrium to the new one as long the total payoff-welfare impact is improving. 
9
 The coalitions should consist all players (ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea). Other omitted coalitions jumps 
from Tier III to Tier I are presented in Appendix4.  
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Not all possible coalition is included in the analysis of the EAFTA through coalitional trade games.  Then, this 
condition is called as the restrictive rule, where some coalitional trade agreements are ignored from the whole 
processes of the EAFTA. The omitted coalitions are impossible to conclude because some countries (FTAs) have 
been with ASEAN in the existing FTAs. Therefore, the new coalitions (in the model) are not able to ignore the 
existing coalitions (the members of the existing FTAs cannot leave or destruct their memberships). As an 
example, coalition of {(ASEAN6, China, Japan), Korea} will be feasible if Korea is not coming alone but with 
ASEAN6, or they are joining as ASEAN-Korea. They should be together unless they are in coalition where all 
members are new comers. It should be {CJK, AC, AK} not {CJK, AC} or {CJK, AK}. The restrictive rule 
applied in the analysis is different from the concept of multiple memberships in some FTAs at the same time. 
 
3.3 The Payoffs of Trade Coalitional Games 
In addition to the use of coalitional game model, this study also employs the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) Model. The GTAP model is used to get the payoffs of trade negotiation games. The GTAP Model is a 
multi-region-multi-sector Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with the assumption of perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale and bilateral trade is brought to the model under the Armington 
assumption (Hertel, ed. 1997).
10
 Production by a firm in each sector in each region is represented by a multi-
                                                 
10
 Imports of intermediate goods are distinguished by import partner country or the country of origin (Armington 
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level production function that involves added values and intermediate inputs. On the demand side, total income 
is allocated among three kinds of final demands: government, private household and savings, which are derived 
from the aggregate utility function of Cobb-Douglas type. There are some treatments in using the endowment 
factors in the production processes. Land and natural resources are assumed to be used exclusively by 
agricultural and food production sectors. Labor is assumed to be mobile across industries but not across 
countries/regions. International capital is set to be mobile across industries and regions (free capital flows). 
Equilibrium satisfies the conditions where demand equals supply for all goods and factors of production, and the 
firms in each industry earn zero profit.  In the GTAP model, the equivalent variation (EV) shows the level of 
economic welfare
11
. The EV is considered as the payoff because this shows the welfare impact received by one 
country as the consequence of its trade strategy applied in trade negotiation game. The aggregation process by 
sectors and by countries/regions can be found in Appendix 1and 2. 
 
4. Simulations And Discussion 
4.1 The Classification of Trade Coalitional Games 
Table 1 presents the value of coalition v (C), including the grand coalition v (N)
12
. The possible coalitions in the 
establishment of the EAFTA are classified into four groups: Tier I, Tier II, Tier III, and Tier IV. As long as the 
coalitions are in the core, the coalitions in Tier I have smaller v (C) than that of Tier II and III. Under the same 
condition, v (C) in Tier II is smaller than that of Tier III.
13
 This is in line with the argument that larger 
membership of FTA could create larger welfare impacts for the members. More detail discussion of each tier is 
as follows:  
1) Tier I. 
It is just an individual country (group) before starting to establish a bilateral FTA. 
2) Tier II. 
In tier II, the interested members to the liberalization in East Asian Region try to have bilateral FTA. The 
ASEAN-China FTA and ASEAN-Korean FTA are just two examples. Other bilateral FTA may exist soon such 
as ASEAN-Japan FTA, Japan-Korean FTA and China-Japan FTA. Trade coalitions in Tier II are the first step to 
the establishment of the EAFTA through trade coalitional games. The EAFTA depends on the successful stories 
of these bilateral FTAs. 
3) Tier III. 
Tier III consists of trade coalitions of {ASEAN6, China, Japan}, {ASEAN6, China, Korea}, {ASEAN6, Japan, 
Korea} and {China, Japan, Korea}. These four coalitions are in the core which can be tested with their respective 
sub-coalitions. For example, in the case of trade coalitional game of {ASEAN6, China, Japan}, none of the sub-
coalitions of {(ASEAN6, China), Japan}, {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Japan)} and {(ASEAN6, China), 
(ASEAN6, Japan), (China, Japan)} are wining coalitions. It means that the ASEAN6-China-Japan FTA is stable 
and no member countries want to unilaterally deviate from the agreement. 
4) Tier IV, Trade coalition of {ASEAN6, China, Japan, Korea}. 
In tier IV, the grand coalition consisting of all players {ASEAN6, China, Japan and Korea} has the largest 
payoff of USD 21,070.06 million. It is in the core and stable coalition because there is no winning coalition 
which has larger payoff than that of grand coalition v (N). The possible sub-coalitions of {(ASEAN6, China, 
Japan), (ASEAN6, Korea)}, {(ASEAN6, China, Korea), Japan}, {(ASEAN6, China, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}, 
{(ASEAN6, China, Korea), (China, Japan)}, {(ASEAN6, China, Korea), (Korea, Japan)}, {(ASEAN6, Japan, 
Korea), (ASEAN6, China)} and {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)} could be the last 
step to the grand coalition. In addition to the definition of FTA in Part II, it is necessary to understand the 
specific meaning of the FTA through the coalitional processes. The FTA coming from coalition is determined by 
the process of (road to) its establishment and membership. In a stable (grand) coalition of FTA, the members do 
not have incentive to deviate from the membership by establishing sub-coalition of FTA. This is because 
deviation from the current FTA does not give larger benefits to the deviating member(s). 
Table 1. Trade Coalitional Games and Their Payoffs 
Coalition v ( C ) IDN MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AS6 CHN JPN KOR 
 Tier IV 
 Grand Coalition v (N)* 
                                                                                                                                                        
assumption) (Hertel, ed. 1997).  
11
 The EV is the difference between the expenditure required to obtain the new (post-simulation) level of utility 
at initial prices and the utility available initially (Huff and Hertel 2000). 
12
 The detail coalitions including the omitted ones are stored in Appendix 3.  
13
 Checking the stability of the v (C) in the core should be compared with the respective sub-coalitions. 
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ACJK 21070.1 275.1 993.6 -73.2 -30.4 1695.4 980.4 3841.0 3226.5 7318.5 6684.1 
 Sub-coalitions 
(ACJ, AK) 7733.2 -108.8 -163.8 -84.0 -143.4 -170.8 -101.2 -772.1 1261.1 442.0 6802.3 
(ACK, J) 10071.7 -55.1 233.4 -194.9 -556.2 850.6 190.7 468.6 2269.6 8018.7 -685.2 
(ACK, AJ) 6784.7 -133.2 -338.0 -144.2 -303.7 -329.9 -53.8 -1302.6 2688.4 5779.2 -380.3 
(ACK, CJ) 4368.5 54.8 483.7 -64.9 -251.4 1063.3 225.8 1511.1 -627.2 3170.6 314.0 
(ACK, KJ) 8897 -22.5 286.0 -162.5 -500.7 890.6 197.0 687.9 2476.6 6976.4 -1243.9 
(AJK, AC) 12584.7 -196.7 -423.6 -185.9 -402.3 -433.9 -147.3 -1789.6 3677.8 4607.3 6089.3 
Extra**            
(AC, AK, AJ) 13694.2 -228.7 -486.4 -216.5 -449.5 -487.7 -156.7 -2025.6 3545.8 5669.6 6504.4 
 Tier III 
 Coalition (ASEAN6, China and Japan) 
 ACJ 13402.6 285.4 1011.8 -8.3 136.6 1663.8 778.8 3868.1 2617.9 6916.6 -1220.0 
(AC,J) 9954.5 -44.4 255.7 -178.1 -539.4 862.4 186.7 543.0 2135.1 7276.5 -913.7 
(AC,AJ) 6416.8 -111.0 -300.0 -122.5 -278.6 -297.7 -53.4 -1163.2 2578.8 5001.2 -652.9 
(AC, CJ) 3441.6 71.2 519.0 -44.5 -222.7 1088.3 230.3 1641.63 -441.6 2241.6 -210.8 
(AC,AJ,CJ)            
 Coalition (ASEAN6, China and Korea) 
 ACK 12014.7 333.3 765.4 128.8 506.5 832.0 789.4 3355.3 1482.1 -1183.9 7177.3 
(AC,AK) 7271.6 -88.2 -134.2 -67.2 -128.6 -182.0 -91.3 -691.5 1249.3 -347.6 6713.8 
(AC,AK,CK)            
 Coalition (ASEAN6, Japan and Korea) 
AJK 6083.0 126.3 600.1 -65.3 -325.4 1244.5 511.2 2091.4 -728.2 3095.3 896.3 
(AK,J) 4920.0 42.9 476.7 -77.5 -283.0 1092.3 232.4 1483.7 -526.4 3246.1 190.1 
(AK,AJ) 1283.2 -29.6 -56.7 -27.7 -40.7 -48.7 -8.9 -212.4 -166.2 1017.1 478.5 
(AK, JK) 4127.8 60.9 512.8 -56.9 -295.0 1167.9 312.6 1702.4 -500.4 2431.6 -6.2 
(AK,AJ,JK)            
 Coalition (China, Japan and Korea) 
 CJK 15404.8 -194.9 -390.1 -201.5 -378.5 -349.4 -118.5 -1633.0 3081.3 5809.0 6514.6 
(CJ,K) 8395.3 -94.4 -130.7 -74.9 -116.7 -114.0 -75.6 -606.4 1123.3 378.1 6893.9 
(CK,J) 7939.5 -113.0 -275.9 -139.6 -265.1 -249.0 -42.2 -1084.7 2435.9 5986.2 -482.7 
(JK,C) 14091.2 -166.4 -335.6 -171.0 -332.0 -304.7 -110.5 -1420.2 3226.4 4744.7 6120.2 
(CJ, CK) 1313.2 -24.1 -44.1 -25.2 -36.6 -36.1 -6.5 -172.6 -202.5 978.4 537.3 
(CJ, JK) 7131.5 -69.5 -85.8 -49.1 -80.0 -77.6 -68.1 -430.1 1263.0 -634.4 6502.9 
(CK, JK) 6571.7 -85.4 -221.9 -109.6 -218.4 -204.6 -35.5 -875.4 2643.3 4943.6 -1015.1 
(CJ,JK,CK)            
 Tier II 
      AC 3889.5 317.4 734.3 165.8 632.0 760.1 580.6 3190.3 699.2 -563.0 -262.3 
      AJ 3905.3 60.7 518.6 -55.9 -254.8 1123.9 236.9 1629.2 -372.5 2276.1 -240.7 
      AK 1327.0 91.9 130.8 18.5 -29.1 160.8 281.5 654.4 -181.5 -203.6 672.6 
      CJ 7494.7 -92.7 -241.1 -118.2 -240.6 -220.2 -38.7 -951.4 2291.2 5203.5 -717.0 
      CK 7731.4 -76.0 -99.8 -55.5 -96.5 -88.9 -72.7 -489.4 964.3 -417.3 6767.1 
      JK 1487.2 -26.3 -49.3 -27.8 -41.5 -40.3 -7.1 -192.2 -174.2 1022.8 464.4 
 Tier I: ASEAN, China, Korea, Japan, No FTA 
Notes: *Grand Coalition consists of all players. **The possibility of coalition from Tier II to Tier IV.  
v (C) is the value of coalition.       
4.2  The Coalition Road to the EAFTA 
From the cores and their respective sub-coalitions (as presented in Table 1), the possible ways to conclude the 
EAFTA through trade coalitional games are summarized. All the scenarios at least need two steps to reach the 
EAFTA, but the process of each step under different scenarios take different times. The investigation on the time 
needed to accomplish each step to proceed into the FTA is out of the scope of this study. It just compares the 
value of trade coalitional games on the way to the EAFTA which based on the welfare impacts and the existing 
trade coalitions in the form of FTA, such as ASEAN-China FTA and ASEAN-Korean FTA.  In proposing the 
possible scenarios, the coalitional trade game starts from fewer members to larger memberships. As was studied 
by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996), with increasing larger members (blocks), the regional trade arrangements will 
create larger economic welfares for the members at every step of the formation. In the case of the EAFTA, as a 
small ‘continental block’, it would be a stepping stone to the economic integration in East Asia and further in 
Asia. The complete flow chart of the seven scenarios is plotted in Figure 2. As a note, there are 5 scenarios in the 
chart which are not able to be a pathway to the EAFTA. It is because, by tracing the values of the lower level of 
coalitions v(C), they are not in the core. Theoretically, with the larger numbers of the members (and product 
coverage), FTA should create the larger total benefits. However, this is not always the case from the coalitional 
analysis if one coalition is not in the core. 
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There are two feasible scenarios to the grand coalition (the rest are not in the cores). The order listed below is 
based on the worth (welfare impacts) of coalitional games: 
1) The trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, Japan, Korea), (ASEAN6, China)}. 
2) The trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}. 
 
1. The trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, Japan, Korea), (ASEAN6, China)}. 
The Trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, Japan, Korea), (ASEAN6, China)}, similar to other coalitions, can be 
concluded with two steps, too. First, the existing ASEAN-Korean FTA invites Japan to coalesce together and 
conclude the trade agreement under the ASEAN-Korea-Japan Free Trade Area (AJK FTA). Then, once the AJK 
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FTA established, it can call ASEAN-China FTA to form {(ASEAN6, Japan, Korea), (ASEAN6, China)}, which 
will be the second step to the EAFTA. It gives the welfare increases by USD 12584.72 million. 
 
2. The trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}. 
Trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)} gives the highest welfare impacts 
to the members (USD 13694.2) than trade coalition of {(ASEAN6, Japan, Korea), (ASEAN6, China)}. 
Hypothetically, it seems to be the easiest way to conclude trade negotiation games. The free trade agreement 
between ASEAN and Japan has been in the process. It means generally that the process take less time than the 
new formation of FTA. By having ASEAN-Japan FTA and two existing FTAs: ASEAN-China FTA and 
ASEAN-Korean FTA, then they can construct the coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), 
(ASEAN6, Japan)} and further realize free trade agreement under the EAFTA. 
 
For negotiating countries, the total welfare should be in the priority to get together to achieve a common goal of 
integrated economies in East Asia. The possible solution is by tracking the pathway of {(ASEAN6, China), 
(ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)} which does not give any preferences to the negotiating countries (please 
refer to Table 1 or Figure 2 for this consideration). This alternative will have the flow as presented in Figure 3: 
 
 
Based on the analysis of trade coalitional games consisting of ASEAN6 countries, China, Japan and Korea, it 
seems that the creation of EAFTA is reachable and feasible. From the most reachable one, it seems that ASEAN 
countries can be a catalyst to the EAFTA or as the driving force to achieve the common goals as was stated in 
the Declaration of the ASEAN Plus Three Summit in December 2005.
14
 This is because ASEAN can be the 
members of any bilateral FTAs more easily than other countries. In addition, the declaration in 2005 sent also a 
prospective sign of economic integration through a gradual process by setting up and supporting cooperation 
under the ASEAN Plus One processes, and then by forming the ASEAN Plus Three framework. The ASEAN 
Plus One can be seen as the bilateral FTA such as  ASEAN-China FTA, ASEAN-Korea FTA and ASEAN-Japan 
FTA.  
 
The findings of the strategy of Japan within East Asian economic integration support the predictions of other 
studies. The conclusion of ASEAN-Japan Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) will increase the possibility 
of the EAFTA through this alternative scenario. The economic alliances that Japan has recently proposed under 
its FTA with ASEAN and then followed by the bilateral FTAs, framed as EPA, are supporting evidences for how 
Japan behaves in the EAFTA trade games. 
 
4.3  Japan and ASEAN in Coalitional Game 
The road to the establishment of bilateral FTA with ASEAN6 member countries initiated by Japan is different 
from the ones concluded under ASEAN-China FTA and ASEAN-Korea FTA. Japan has also been pursuing 
economic integration with ASEAN members under the EPA which is proposed to cover not only market for 
traded goods (by eliminating import tariff and other trade barriers), but also cooperate in lowering business costs, 
increasing investment and technology cooperation.  
 
The intention of Japan to have economic integration with ASEAN member countries have been started with the 
conclusion of the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) in January 2002. It came into 
force on 30 November 2002. The creation of the JSEPA inspired partly the establishment of the bilateral FTA 
between Japan and other individual ASEAN countries (Chirathivat, 2007). Coincidently, Japan has been 
pursuing bilateral FTA with ASEAN as a single entity by signing the framework agreement of Comprehensive 
                                                 
14
 The common goal of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit pledged on 12 
December 2005 is to implement a long term goal of East Asian community which benefit the people with 
prosperity and peace.  
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Economic Partnership (CEP) between Japan and ASEAN in ASEAN-Japan Summit in Bali in 2003. The 
negotiations have been initiated and scheduled to conclude in 2012. 
 
In the following years, Japan signed the agreement with Thailand under the Japan-Thailand Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) in September 2005
15
. The Japan EPA with Indonesia was signed in August 
2007 under the Japan-Indonesian Economic Partnership Agreement (JIEPA). Intensive talks of economic 
integration with other individual ASEAN countries have been also in progress.  
 
From the coalitional trade negotiation we can draw a road map of the East Asian economic integration from 
Japan’s perspectives. Table 2 shows the economic benefits of ASEAN-Japan FTA based on the coalitional trade 
games under ASEAN6 as individual countries. This table presents that bilateral FTAs between Japan and 
individual ASEAN countries give positive impacts to both Japan and its partners. The total impact is then used as 
a value of coalition v (C) (in first column). Under the individual bilateral FTAs, once Japan has an FTA with, for 
example, Philippines, the FTA will give impacts to other ASEAN countries (including China, Korea and Rest of 
the World (ROW). Similarly, when Japan has an FTA with Indonesia, it creates welfare impacts (negative) to the 
rest. If we sum up the impacts of the simultaneous FTAs, the welfare impacts to each ASEAN6 members will be 
similar to the one under ASEAN-Japan FTA. For example, the summation of the impacts of IJ, MJ, PJ, SJ, TJ 
and VJ to Indonesia is similar to the welfare impact of ASEAN6-Japan FTA to Indonesia, which is around USD 
60.7 million. 
 
Table 2. Trade Coalitions Between Japan and ASEAN6 
Coalitions v (C ) IDN MYS PHL SGP THA VNM AS6 CHN JPN KOR 
 Grand Coalition v (N)* 
AJ 3905.3 60.7 518.6 -55.9 -254.8 1123.9 236.9 1629.2 -372.5 2276.1 -240.7 
 Sub-coalitions 
      IJ 358.7 139.4 -16.0 -6.1 -36.4 -17.4 -1.7 61.9 -43.3 219.3 -39.3 
      MJ 1316.0 -29.8 679.9 -28.5 -168.3 -52.2 -5.7 395.5 -116.0 636.2 -68.7 
      PJ 189.6 -4.6 -9.4 63.7 -11.9 -8.9 0.4 29.3 -20.8 126.0 -19.7 
      SJ 98.9 -1.6 -6.6 -2.3 110.5 -2.8 -4.4 92.8 -8.2 -11.6 -2.7 
      TJ 2432.1 -35.7 -117.3 -73.1 -134.4 1230.8 -28.8 841.5 -136.4 1201.4 -84.7 
      VJ 382.1 -7.1 -13.0 -9.59 -14.3 -25.6 277.1 208.4 -47.9 1050 -25.7 
Notes: Grand Coalition consists of all players. v (C) is the value of coalition.  
 
The conclusion of the ASEAN Japan (AJ) FTA is feasible, as presented in Figure 4. This is because the value of 
coalitional trade game v (C) is larger than sub-coalitions which are right now still in the progress of conclusion. 
 
 
 
The principle of CEP between Japan and ASEAN members in 2003 stated that he CEP should involve Japan and 
all ASEAN member countries. No countries will be left behind in the agreements. So, from this principle, there 
is no possibility to coalesce some countries by ignoring the others. The only acceleration for individual ASEAN 
country  is the flexibility of the conclusion. This acceleration accommodates the differences in the level of 
                                                 
15
 The hard talks between Japan and Thailand in the conclusion of JTEPA were related to the negotiation on steel, 
automobiles and farm products (Chirathivat 2007). 
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developments of the ASEAN members (especially for the new members of ASEAN) and addresses the sensitive 
sectors by gradually including them in the agreements.   
 
4.4  The Countries’ Perspectives on Coalitional Game in the EAFTA 
Table 3 shows the countries’ perspectives on the coalitional processes in the creation of the EAFTA. China, 
Japan and Korea do not want to directly join the EAFTA by establishing grand coalition. Creating a sub-
coalition is the best way for China and Japan to realize the EAFTA both in Tier III or Tier IV, and for Korea in 
Tier IV. This is because the direct establishment of the FTA (as a core) always gives them less welfare impacts 
than the sub-coalitional trade games. For example, China will not enter directly the China-Japan-Korea FTA if 
this agreement is established, instead of waiting Japan and Korea form the FTA first and then China will come as 
the third player. It is similar to Japan’s case. The different perspective is from ASEAN6’s point of view, where 
the grand coalition and other direct formations of lower tier (Tier III) always give the highest benefits for 
ASEAN6. 
Table 3. Countries’ Perspectives of Coalitions and Sub-Coalitions 
 Tier Core 
Player’s Best Choice in  
Sub-coalitions 
Core ≥ Sub-Coalition 
China Tier I  C  
 Tier II  (AC)  
 Tier III (ACJ) (AC, AJ) Yes 
  (ACK) (AC, AK) Yes 
  (CJK) (JK, C) No 
 Tier IV (ACJK) (ACJ, AK) No 
Japan Tier I  J  
 Tier II  J  
 Tier III (ACJ) (AC, J) No 
  (AJK) (AK, J) No 
  (CJK) (CK, J) No 
 Tier IV (ACJK) (ACK, J) No 
Korea Tier I  K  
 Tier II  AK  
 Tier III (ACK) (AC, AK) Yes 
  (AJK) (AJ, AK) Yes 
  (CJK) (CJ, K) No 
 Tier IV (ACJK) (ACJ, AK) No 
ASEAN Tier I  A  
 Tier II  (AC)  
 Tier III (ACJ) (AC, CJ) Yes 
  (ACK) (AC, AK) Yes 
  (AJK) (AK, JK) Yes 
 Tier IV (ACJK) (ACK, CJ) Yes 
It is common for big countries to prefer bilateral (less membership negotiation) than multilateral (larger 
membership) agreement. Under the asymmetry conditions of negotiators in terms of market size (i.e., a large and 
some small countries in the party) and negotiation power, the large economies prefer the bilateral trading regime. 
Meanwhile, the smaller countries prefer a multilateral bargaining regime (Kim, 2004). 
 
There is one interesting case for China in Tier III in the case of the establishment of ASEAN-China-Korea FTA. 
From Table 3 we can realize that the sub-coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea)} is no longer 
beneficial than its core {ASEAN6, China, Korea} for China.  The real world showed that China took the first 
step earlier to make a closer trade relationship with ASEAN and then followed by Korea. From sub-coalitional 
perspective, the sub-coalition of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea)} is the best choice for China, Korea and 
ASEAN6 in order to be in the larger membership of FTA. The creation of ASEAN – China FTA has attracted 
Korea to establish the ASEAN – Korea FTA. 
 
If we consider the sources of power coming from the ability to control the markets, ASEAN does not have 
enough capacity to control the markets (it is because its total trade was relatively smaller than other three 
countries). The best scenario of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)} reflects on how the 
involvement of ASEAN could determine the success of the EAFTA. From the empirical perspectives, ASEAN 
has a position to control the direction of the economic integration in East Asia by establishing FTAs with China, 
Korea and ongoing processes of negotiation with Japan (both ASEAN as individual and a single entity). The 
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attendance of ASEAN in the process of East Asian economic integration could be a catalyst which is in line with 
the results that all the cores (Tier III and IV) are beneficial for ASEAN than the sub-coalitions.     
 
5. Conclusion 
The coalition is one way to establish the EAFTA when a consensus among all East Asian countries is difficult to 
reach. From the perspective of coalitional game, the grand coalition of ASEAN6, China, Japan and Korea under 
the EAFTA is in the core, which is stable as no winning coalition is against it. At the lower tiers (tier III), 
coalitional games of ASEAN6-China-Japan, ASEAN6-China-Korea, ASEAN6-Japan-Korea and China-Japan-
Korea are in the cores. It means that these coalitions are stable and it could be the possible ways to establish the 
EAFTA. The countries try to deal in the coalition forms with the highest total welfares for all countries in which 
they finally come to the formation of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}. The 
possibility of this scenario is supported by the intention of Japan and ASEAN under the CEP agreement.  
 
The EAFTA can be concluded more easily and seems to take less time if trade coalitional game takes the 
roadmap of {(ASEAN6, China), (ASEAN6, Korea), (ASEAN6, Japan)}. From the alternative coalition, it seems 
that the presence of ASEAN6 can be in any coalition and be a catalyst to the EAFTA. 
 
In spite of the significant results, the current study has more interesting findings if the more advanced general 
equilibrium models which allow scale economy and imperfect competition are employed. The use of the 
dynamic model of GTAP is more challenging than that of using the standard one. Since then, the use of the 
dynamic model could accommodate the disequilibrium condition of international capital mobility and the 
changing stock of capital in the region. This would possibly consequently bring the higher welfare impacts of the 
negotiating countries and change the direction of coalitional trade negotiation. 
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